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Abstract: 
This paper examines the gender patterns of occupational mobility in post-reform 
Urban  China  using  a  national  representative  dataset.  The  results  reveal  marked 
differences  between  married  men  and  women:  women  are  more  likely  than  men  to 
undergo  lateral  or  downward  occupational  changes,  but  are  less  likely  to  experience 
upward mobility. The results also show that the public-sector restructuring has increased 
the  incidence  of  downward  occupational  mobility,  more  for  women  than  men.  The 
analysis suggests that women are disadvantaged in the occupational mobility process by a 
variety of social and institutional factors.                   
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1.    Introduction   
China’s transition from a centrally planed to a market economy over the past three 
decades has fundamentally changed the mechanisms for labor reallocation and 
compensation in the urban sector. A large body of studies has emerged examining how 
the economic transition has affected the status of women relative to men in the labor 
market. While much of the research has been done on the gendered impacts for labor 
force participation, employment status, and wages, studies on occupational mobility 
remain sparse. The present paper sets to fill in the knowledge gap by examining the 
gender differences in occupational mobility in urban China with a national representative 
dataset collected in 2000.   
Occupational mobility is an important feature of the labor market in market 
economies where people change jobs to find a better match with ability and interest and a 
more rewarding career (Burdett 1978; Jovanovic 1979; Shaw 1987; Sicherman and Galor 
1990). Understanding occupational mobility is important for the analysis of wage 
movement and occupational attainment. In transition economies, increased occupational 
mobility is a major labor market outcome of the reforms. The public-sector restructuring 
and the emergence of the private sector bring about massive labor reallocation both 
within and between firms, sectors, industries and regions.
2  The structural adjustments 
create new opportunities for career advancement and, at the same time, also destroy 
millions of positions and force people to move to occupations that have a lower skill 
requirement or offer a lower pay (Sabirianova 2002). The patterns of occupational 
                                                        
2 Dong and Xu (2009) document the massive labor adjustments following the 
public-sector restructuring in 1997 in China. For the labor market restructuring in Central 
and East European countries and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, see Faggio and Konings (1999), Brown and Earle (2002) and Broadman and 
Recanatini (2003) and Konings and Walsh (2003).       3 
mobility have important implications to economic well-being.   
Until recently, the research on occupational mobility in post-reform China was, 
for the most part, the undertaking of sociologists interested in social stratification.
3  Cao 
and Hu (2007) study gender differences in the reasons of occupational mobility in urban 
China using data collected from six coastal cities in 1997. They find that, compared to 
married men, married women are less likely to undertake career-oriented job changes, but 
are more likely to change jobs to meet family needs or to encounter involuntary job 
termination, and that the gender differences in occupational mobility increased during the 
reform period. The present study extends the work by Cao and Hu in three aspects. First, 
we focus on the directionality of occupational mobility and distinguish four types of 
mobility: 1) being job stayers; 2) downward changes; 3) lateral changes, and 4) upward 
changes. We estimate the determinants of occupational mobility directions and explore 
the underlying sources of the gender gaps in occupational mobility. Second, our data are 
from a survey that covers all Chinese provinces except for Ningxia and Qinghai, 
overcoming the regional limitation of the study by Cao and Hu (2007). Finally, our data 
was collected in December 2000, permitting a close look at the impact of the 
public-sector restructuring, the radical phase of China’s urban labor market reform, 
launched in 1997.   
For a preview, the estimates reveal marked differences between men and women in 
occupational mobility. Women are more likely than men to undergo lateral or downward 
occupational changes, but are less likely to experience upward moves. The estimates also 
show that the public-sector restructuring sharply increases the probability of downward 
mobility, more for women than men. The analysis suggests that women’s ability to buffer 
                                                        
3  For a literature survey, see Bian (2002).       4 
against market shocks and advance their careers is limited by a variety of cultural and 
institutional factors, such as societal expectation of gender role, unequal access to social 
networks and social protection and assistance, and discriminatory practices on the part of 
employers. The results of this paper support the growing body of literature demonstrating 
that the process of economic transition is not gender-neutral.     
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Gender and Occupational Mobility in Established Market Economies       
Much of the research on occupational mobility has been done for established 
market economies, where occupational mobility is largely driven by the considerations of 
job matching and career mobility. The job matching theory regards occupational mobility 
as a means for workers and firms to overcome incomplete information and market 
uncertainty (Jovanovic, 1979). The theory predicts a negative effect of job tenure on 
mobility because the match between rewards and ability improves over time. The career 
mobility theory focuses on the role of human capital investment for career advancement 
(Sicherman and Galor, 1990). In accordance with this theory, an individual allocates the 
finite lifetime between education and various occupations in order to maximize the 
expected life time earnings. The individual chooses the optimal quitting time for a job 
and thus part of returns to education is in the form of higher probabilities of occupational 
advancement. Other things being equal, more educated individuals are more likely to be 
promoted within the firm or move to another firm which offers a higher paying job. The 
career mobility theory also predicts a positive effect of job tenure on occupational 
mobility; individuals with higher seniority acquire more skills and experience and 
therefore they are more likely to be promoted.       5 
Recent advances in social capital theory have drawn attention to the ways 
individuals’ social networks affect occupational mobility. It is widely noticed that access 
to social networks improves the chances of obtaining a good job offer or receiving a 
promotion.
4  One explanation for this is that social networks can potentially improve the 
quality of the match between workers and jobs by providing workers with information 
about the workplace prior to being hired and reducing the employer’s uncertainty about 
workers’ productivity (Datcher 1983; MaCall 1988; Simon and Warner 1992). An 
alternative explanation for the role of social networks is favoritism; employers may prefer 
well-connected workers in hiring and promotion, regardless of their productivity 
(Granovetter 1974; Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan 1980). Theoretically, the 
informational role of social networks is consistent with the expected behaviors of workers 
and firms in efficient factor markets while the favoritism hypothesis may find support 
from organizations that pursue non-economic objectives. 
Job matching and career mobility are not the only causes for occupational mobility; 
technological progress, business cycles and policy changes (e.g. economic deregulation 
and trade liberalization) also bring about occupational changes, often of involuntary 
nature such as lay-offs. Voluntary and involuntary moves tend to affect wage growth 
differently, with the former being associated with wage growth and the latter often 
resulting in wage losses (Mincer 1986; Keith and McWilliams 1999). This difference 
between voluntary and involuntary moves is due to the fact that the reservation wage is 
usually higher for a quitter than a laid-off worker. The quitters are likely to undertake job 
search while stilled employed, whereas the laid-off worker may engage in job search after 
separation-while unemployed. Moreover, involuntary separation associated with 
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structural adjustments may render past human capital investment partly or entirely 
obsolete, while voluntary moves are not so “destructive”.   
Analysts have long recognized that women experience less upward occupational 
mobility than men during their careers, and the gender difference in occupational 
mobility is a main source of the gender wage gap in market economies (Lazear 1995). 
The gender differences in occupational mobility are often attributed to the differences in 
men’s and women’s labor market behaviors due to the societal expectation that men are 
the breadwinner and women are the caretaker. Women encounter workforce interruptions 
associated with child bearing and rearing, and women’s intermittent labor force 
participation may reduce their human capital investment and thereby their chances of 
occupational upgrading (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Jones and Makepeace, 1996; 
Royalty 1998). Women also tend to choose different career patterns from men because 
they value certain aspects of jobs, such as flexible working hours due to their household 
responsibilities (Becker 1957; Polachek, 1980). Given the trade-off between wages and 
skill levels and desire to work part-time/flexible hours, women are arguably more likely 
than men to choose occupations that do not require much human capital investment or 
such investment will not depreciate from workforce interruptions. Moreover, men and 
women may change jobs for different reasons (Kahn and Griesinger, 1989). Men are 
more likely than women to leave the firm if not promoted; in contrast, women are more 
likely to quit for family reasons (following husbands or taking care of children or elderly 
parents). Because workers who quit for economic reasons are more likely than those who 
quit for non-economic reasons to search for new jobs while still employed, the former 
should have a higher probability of receiving a better job offer than the latter (Keith and   7 
McWilliams 1999).   
In addition to social gender norms, women’s labor market opportunities are also 
limited by other institutional constraints. Feminist scholars contend that due to gender 
segregation and domestic responsibilities, personal contacts and informal information are 
less accessible to women than men, thereby hampering women’s labor market outcomes 
(King and Manson, 2001; Timeberlake, 2005). Studies find that men were more active 
than women in job search while still employed and employed job search is instrumental 
for wage growth (Keith and McWilliams 1999), and that men also spent more time 
contacting friends and relatives than women for job search (Jones 1989). Due to the 
gender differences in search activity, voluntary job mobility may have a bigger positive 
effect on men’s career advancement than women’s.   
The gender bias of employers in promotion and hiring is another widely 
recognized institutional factor that may contribute to the gender differences in 
occupational mobility.    Analysts have noticed that women have less chance of being 
promoted to higher job levels than men and termed the phenomenon the “glass ceiling” 
effect. Lazear and Rosen (1990) explain the employers’ bias against women in promotion 
by the differences between men and women in the value of non-market activities. They 
argue that because women have a comparative advantage in non-market activities and 
consequently face greater work-family conflict than men, the optimal response on the 
part of an employer is to set tougher promotion criteria for women than men. Krowas 
(1993) and Jones and Makepeace (1996) find evidence supporting the “glass ceiling” 
argument. An alternative explanation for the gender differences in upward mobility is the 
“dead-end” argument. In light of this argument, women are less likely to be found in   8 
higher level jobs than men because employers are reluctant to hire women for jobs that 
offer opportunities for promotion. Groot, Maassen and Brink (1996) find evidence 
consistent with the “dead-end” explanation.   
Analysts have also noticed that job separation from regulated sectors has a larger 
negative effect on women’s wage growth than men’s (Maxwell and D’Amico, 1986; 
Madden, 1987; Crossley, 1994). These studies find that workers who are separated from 
the sector paying economic rents (e.g., the unionized sector) and subsequently find new 
jobs in competitive sectors endure wage losses because the pre-displacement wage 
overstates market worth for these workers, and the wage losses are particularly 
pronounced for women. In light of the empirical evidence that the gender earnings gap is 
relatively small in unionized organizations where wage rules stipulated in collective 
bargaining agreements restrain managerial discretions (Hirsch and Schumacher, 1998; 
Elvira and Saporta, 2001), women displaced from the unionized sector would lose not 
only the rents accrued to all union members but also the gender-specific protection 
provided by the union. Thus, women are more likely than men to undergo downward 
occupational mobility following economic deregulation.   
2.2 Economic Transition and Women’s Wages and Employment in Urban China   
Prior to reforms, almost all working-age men and women in urban China joint the 
labor force after school graduation. The job was assigned by the government and 
guaranteed for life while the wage structure was centrally determined, primarily on the 
basis of workers’ education and seniority (Korzec, 1992). Labor mobility rates were thus 
very low. In the socialist era, women’s status in society was improved considerably. 
Chinese women’s labor force participation rates were among the highest in the world and   9 
the gender earnings gap in China was remarkably small by international standards (Croll, 
1983). However, sex segregation was prevalent; women were crowded into the 
overstaffed clerical and low-level administrative occupations and overrepresented in 
urban collectives, which offered lower pay and fewer benefits than did state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Ngo, 2002). Women were also underrepresented politically despite 
that Communist party membership played a pivotal role in career advancement in the 
pre-reform era (Walder 1986).   
In the late 1970s China began its transition to a market-oriented economy with a 
gradual approach. The wage-setting policies of SOEs became more decentralized; the 
managers of state enterprises were granted autonomy in hiring and promotion; workers 
who entered the labor force after 1986 were placed on short-term contracts instead of 
being offered permanent employment (Friedman 1996). The growth of rural 
township-village enterprises (TVEs), private firms and foreign invested companies 
attracted workers from the state sector as well as rural areas (Dong and Bowles 2002). 
The labor market reforms provided workers with greater freedom to pursue voluntary 
occupational changes. The pace of market reforms accelerated in the 1990s. In late 1992, 
the central government formally endorsed private property rights and initiated ownership 
reforms to SOEs. In 1994, a new labor law was passed sanctioning the right of employers 
to dismiss workers. In 1997, the government launched a large-scale labor retrenchment 
program in an attempt to revitalize SOEs. The SOE-sector restructuring has brought 
about massive labor reallocation both within and between sectors, industries and regions, 
bringing an end to the era of ‘iron rice bowl” for Chinese urban workers (Giles et al. 2006; 
Dong and Xu 2009).     10 
The economic transition has brought about rapid economic growth and significant 
improvement in the standards of living for Chinese workers. However, studies suggest 
that the transition has not benefited men and women equally. Wages have grown faster 
for men than women, and consequently the gender wage gap have increased markedly in 
the post-reform period (Maurer-Fazio et al. 1999; Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Zhang et al. 
2008). Moreover, women were laid off at higher rates than men and experienced greater 
difficulty finding re-employment in the private sector (Appleton et al, 2002). In 
consequence, women’s unemployment rates were higher than men’s and their 
unemployment spells were longer (Giles, Park, and Cai 2006; Du and Dong 2008; Ding, 
Dong and Li, 2009). Women have also withdrawn from the labor force in larger numbers 
since the 1990s (Maurer-Fazio, Hughes and Zhang 2007). More and more married 
women are changing jobs from formal into informal sectors where wages are low, 
working conditions are poor, and social security and protections are largely unavailable 
(Yi and Chien 2002; Yuan and Cook 2009). Studies also indicate that, as with displaced 
union workers in established market economies, women suffered a larger decrease in 
compensation in the process of labor reshuffling from the public to the private sector (Du 
and Fan 2005; Knight and Li 2006; Zhang and Dong 2008).   
In the remainder of the paper, we evaluate the impact of economic transition on 
women’s status in the labor market by exploring the differences between married men 
and women in the directions of occupational mobility in the post-reform period. 
3. Conceptual Framework and Empirical Methodology   
  We distinguish four types of occupational mobility based on the change in the 
Socio-Economic Index (SEI) of 3-digit occupations: 1) job stayers; 2) downward   11 
mobility; 3) lateral mobility; and 4) upward mobility. We propose that in the post-reform 
period, married women are more likely to experience job turbulence and downward 
occupational changes than their male counterparts, but are less likely to undergo upward 
changes, for four main reasons. First, due to the declining influence of socialist ideology, 
the Confucian patriarchal values that were suppressed to a certain degree in the socialist 
era have reemerged in the post-reform era, leading to more widespread acceptance of 
traditional gender role within families (Summerfield 1994; Yee, 2001). As Cao and Hu 
2007) show, in post-reform urban China, married men were more likely than married 
women to change job for career advancement, whereas women displayed a greater 
tendency to change job to attend family matters. The gender differences in voluntary 
occupational changes are pointed as likely sources of the gender gap in upward mobility 
(Keith and McWilliams 1999).   
Secondly, women have limited access to social networks. In the post-reform era, 
private information networks and personal connections (guanxi) became increasingly 
important for job security and career advancement (Bian 1997; Giles et al. 2006). People 
gathered information and developed personal connections through parents, spouses, 
relatives, friends, and political affiliations. Du and Dong (2009) find that relatives and 
friends were a more effective job search channel for men than women in 
post-restructuring urban China. Women’s political under-representation may also 
handicap women in the labor market. Although the reform has diminished the importance 
of political royalty for career advancement, Communist party membership remains an 
important means to buffer against job instability and promote career opportunities 
(Walder 1995; Bian, Shu and Logan 2001).     12 
Thirdly, social protections and reemployment assistance are arguably more 
accessible to men than women, largely due to pre-reform sex segregation. Historically, 
women were concentrated in the collective sector. Compared to SOE workers, collective 
workers were more vulnerable to economic shocks and thereby lay-offs since urban 
collectives had been cut off from state subsidies long before SOEs. And many SOEs tried 
to adjust the workforce through re-deployment instead of outright lay-offs to minimize 
the adverse effect of restructuring on workers, especially in the early 1990s (Friedman 
1996), while such moderate restructuring options were generally not feasible for urban 
collectives. Moreover, during the restructuring, a reemployment program was introduced, 
which provided displaced workers with basic living allowances, training and job 
replacement services and paid the premiums on their pensions, unemployment, and health 
insurance (Lee, 2000). With the social assistances, displaced workers were able to search 
longer and search more effectively for jobs that met their expectations, thereby 
minimizing downward occupational moves. However, the reemployment program 
targeted primarily displaced state workers.
5  The lack of access to social protection and 
assistance by non-state workers in conjunction with the historical pattern of sex 
segregation may further disadvantage women in the post-restructuring labor market.
6   
Lastly, the incidence of gender discrimination in the urban labor market has become 
more widespread (Parish and Busse 2000) as the market reform substantially reduced the 
state’s regulatory power to protect women. The rising incidence of gender discrimination 
                                                        
5  For instance, in 1999, more than 95 percent of displaced workers in SOEs entered the 
reemployment  program,  with  79  percent  of  them  receiving  the  full  amount  of  living 
subsidies. By contrast, less than one-third to one-fifth of their counterparts in collectives 
and other types of enterprises had access to such programs (Dong, 2003). 
 
6  Du and Dong (2009) find that the probability of reemployment was significantly lower 
for displaced women from urban collectives than their counterparts from SOEs.       13 
would exacerbate the glass ceiling phenomenon and push more women into the 
occupations of dead-end nature. Gender discrimination may become particularly 
prevalent in the post-restructuring period, given that high unemployment rates in this 
period may taper employers’ concern about the negative economic consequences of 
discriminatory practices. Thus, women may be more likely than men to move to 
occupations with lower socio-economic status following the restructuring.   
We will test the conjectures laid out above using multinomial logit regression 
techniques. We first estimate simultaneously the determinants of job changes and 
directions of occupational mobility with the following model:   
  Z X G
P
Pj " ' ) ln( 1 0
0
g l b b + + + =               (1) 
where Pj stands for the probability of the j-th type of mobility with j = 0 for being a job 
stayer, j=1 for downward mobility, j = 2 for lateral mobility, and j = 3 for upward 
mobility. The Greek letters are unknown parameters; G is a gender dummy for women; X 
is a vector of variables measuring individual characteristics such as human capital, social 
networks, family duties, ownership type of the employer, and so on, and Z is a vector of 
proxy variables for market environment.   
We next estimate the determinants of mobility directions for the job movers using 
the following model:     
Z X W G
P
Pj " ' ' ) ln( 1 0
0
g l a b b + + + + =                       (2) 
Where j = 0 for downward mobility, j = 1 for lateral mobility, and j = 2 for upward 
mobility; X and Z are the same as in equation (1), and W is a vector of dummy variables   14 
for the reasons of occupational change.
7  Following Cao and Hu (2007), we classify the 
reasons of occupational mobility into five categories: 1) career development; 2) family 
reasons; 3) company reassignments; 4) involuntary separation; and 5) unspecified reasons. 
The occupational changes due to the first two reasons are worker-initiated moves; the 
differences in men’s and women’s self-initiated occupational changes are indicative of 
their differences in preference. Company reassignments and involuntary separation are 
employer-initiated occupational changes; company reassignments include promotion, job 
transfers and redeployment,
8  and involuntary separation consists of mandatory early 
retirement, lay-offs and job losses as a result of company bankruptcy. The gender 
differences in employer-initiated occupational changes reflect differences in the ways 
men and women are treated. The estimates of the variables for mobility reasoning provide 
information for assessing the extent to which any gender differences in the direction of 
occupational mobility can be attributed to differences in men’s and women’s quitting 
behavior and to differences in employers’ attitudes toward men and women, holding 
constant individual and market characteristics.   
Lastly, we explore if there are any differences in gender patterns of mobility between 
those who changed occupations through company reassignments and those who found 
new positions not through former employers’ arrangement (i.e. those who move to seek 
career development, to attend family needs, or change occupations as a result of 
involuntary separation or unspecified reasons). The former case represents 
administratively managed job match whereas in the latter case job match is achieved, for 
the most part, through market mechanisms. Becker (1957) contends that employer taste 
                                                        
7  Equations (1) and (2) offer a sensitivity check for the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives assumption.     
8  Disaggregate information on company reassignments is, however, unavailable.     15 
discrimination is incompatible with market competition. We test whether gender 
disparities are more pronounced for administrative mach than non-administrative match.   
3. Data and Variables   
The data set we use is drawn from the Second Survey on Social Status of Chinese 
Women undertaken jointly by All China Women Federation (ACWF) and China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics in December 2000. This survey covered all Chinese 
provinces and province-equivalent municipalities except for Ningxia and Qinghai. Using 
a multistage random sampling procedure, the survey organizers interviewed 19,449 men 
and women from both rural and urban areas. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on 
the urban residents who are married, aged between 18 and 55 years, and currently 
employed. To streamline the analysis, we ignore those who are either unemployed or 
have withdrawn from the labor force. Omitting observations with missing information, 
we have a sample of 3,058 men and 3,296 women for empirical analysis.   
According to the survey, 30.2 percent of the workers in the sample have never 
changed job since entering the labor force, and among the remaining 69.8 percent job 
movers, about 63 percent have changed job only once and 37 percent have acquired the 
current job after 1996. Due to the data limitation, we focus on the change between a 
mover’s first job and current job. Following the occupational mobility literature,
9  the 
directions of mobility for job movers are determined by a comparison of the 
Socio-Economic Index (SEI) of the mover’s first job and current job.
10  The SEI provides 
                                                        
9  Killingsworth and Reimers (1983) argue that while wage is an important feature of 
employment status, it does not completely capture the socio-economic prestige of an 
occupation. For example of ranking occupation status by the SEI, see Sicherman and 
Galor (1990) for established market economies and Sabirianova (2002) for transitional 
countries.   
10 While the respondent was asked to report all jobs he/she had worked and also to give   16 
the ranking of a 3-digit occupation according to the occupation’s average years of 
schooling and average monthly earnings in the sample using a formula developed by 
Chunling Li (2005).
11 
The explanatory variables in X include age and its squared term, years of schooling, 
years of actual labor market experience
12  and its squared term, SEI of the first job, SEI 
of father’s occupation, SEI of spouse’s occupation, party membership, number of 
children, a dummy variable for acquiring the current job after 1996, and ownership types 
of the employers. The initial SEI controls for the status of the first job; those holding jobs 
with higher socio-economic status are less likely to quit or move upwardly, other things 
being equal. The socio-economic status of fathers and spouses and party membership are 
proxy variables for access to social networks. Party membership is measured by a dummy 
variable. To avoid potential reverse causality between party member and promotion, the 
variable for party membership for movers is defined based on whether he/she was a 
Communist party member before obtaining the current job. The number of children is a 
proxy for domestic responsibility. The dummy for acquiring current job after 1996 is 
introduced to discern the effect of the public-sector restructuring. Ownership types are 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the main reasons for leaving each job, the responses of the workers who had moved more 
than once for earlier job changes were fairly incomplete. 
11  Li (2005) derived the SEI for 81 3-digit occupations using data from the 
Contemporary Chinese Social Structure Evolution Survey conducted by China Academy 
of Social Sciences in 2001. The survey generated a sample of 6,193 individuals aged 
between 16 and 70 years from 12 provinces. The respondents were asked to rank the 
prestige of each occupation in a scale from zero to 100. Li then regressed the mean 
prestige score of each occupation on the occupation’s average years of schooling and 
average monthly earnings, and obtained the following formula: 
1 2 SEI=10.868 3.496 0.589 x x + + , where 
-
1 x is average years of schooling and 
-
2 x is 
average monthly income. Using the estimates of this formula, we compute the SEI for 79 
occupations and report the results in Appendix. 
 
12  Labor market experience for movers is number of years in the labor force prior to 
acquiring the current job.     17 
measured by three dummy variables, respectively, for urban collectives, private and 
foreign companies, and other ownership types (primarily self-employment and family-run 
business), with state organizations (SOEs and government organizations) as the base 
category. The explanatory variables in Z include proportion of SOE employment in a 
province and seven regional dummies. The proportion of SOE employment is obtained 
from China’s Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2001). The definitions for regions are provided 
in the notes of Table 2.     
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics     
Table 1 presents the distributions of occupational mobility by direction and by 
reason. With respect to the directions, 30.2 percent of the workers in the sample had 
never changed job at the time the survey was done; 28.1 percent had moved downwardly; 
18.8 percent had made lateral moves; and 22.9 percent had experienced upward mobility. 
The gaps between women and men are noticeable: compared to men, the proportion of 
women is 4.0 percentage points lower for being a job stayer, 5.6 percentage points higher 
for downward mobility, 3.4 percentage points higher for lateral mobility, and 4.9 
percentage points lower for upward mobility. Regarding to the reasons of occupational 
mobility, 22.2 percent of the movers changed jobs for career development; 15.9 percent 
changed jobs for family reasons, 39.6 percent changed jobs through company 
reassignments; and 17.2 percent changed jobs due to involuntary separations. It is 
noteworthy that company-reassigned job change is predominately a phoneme of the 
public sectors as it is evident that 77.3 percent of the cases occurred in the state sector, 
16.7 in the collective sector, and the remaining 6 percent in the two private sectors. There   18 
are also marked differences between women and men: the distribution of women is 4.2 
percentage points lower than that of men for career-oriented changes, 9.5 percentage 
points higher for family-oriented changes, 10.7 percentage points lower for company 
arranged changes, and 4.6 percentage points higher for involuntary separation.
13       
Table 2 presents mean values of the explanatory variables for individual and 
market characteristics in X and Z. As can be seen from the table, the differences between 
men and women in human capital characteristics are small; men’s age, years of schooling 
and initial SEI are slightly higher than women’s, and also, interestingly, men’s and 
women’s labor market experiences are almost identical. Thus, unlike women in 
established market economies, workforce interruptions are not a likely source for any 
gender differences in occupational mobility in urban China. There are, however, 
discernible gender differences in other characteristics. Only 7 percent of the women had 
party membership prior to the latest job change while the proportion for men is 15 
percent. With respect to the ownership type of employers, women were over-represented 
in urban collectives, although the distributions of men and women in two types of private 
ownership were similar. The percentage of women who changed job after 1996 is 7 
percentage points higher than that of men, indicating that women experienced greater job 
turbulence following the restructuring. As for the relative status between spouses, the 
spouses of women have higher SEI scores than the spouses of men, which are consistent 
with traditional marriage norms.     
                                                        
13  The information on the reasons of occupational mobility is available only for 70 
percent of the movers. To check the sensitivity of the estimates to the missing 
observations, we also estimated equation (2) using a sample including all movers and 
adding the observations with missing information on mobility reasoning to the base group 
of changing occupations for unspecified reasons. The results are substantively similar to 
those presented in Table 4 and are available upon request.     19 
4.2 Regression results   
The multinomial logit models of occupational mobility determination are estimated 
by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) techniques. We present the marginal effects of 
each explanatory variable derived from the multinomial logit estimates and standard 
errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering by province in Tables 3 to 5. Table 3 
presents the estimates of occupational mobility determination for job stayers and movers 
combined. Part I of the table reports the overall gender gaps obtained by regressing the 
mobility types on the gender indicator and regional dummy variables only. The estimates 
show that compared to men, women are 3.8 percent less likely to be a job stayer, 5.5 
percent more likely to experience downward mobility, 3.4 percent more likely to 
experience lateral changes, and 5.0 percent less likely to move upwardly. All the gender 
differences are significant at the 1% level.     
Part II of Table 3 reports the estimates of equation (1) which controls for all 
individual and market characteristics measured by the variables in X and Z. Before 
commenting on the estimates of gender indicator, we take a look at the estimates of 
covariates. With respect to human capital characteristics, we note that years of schooling 
and labor market experience are positively correlated with the probability of stayers and 
negatively with the probabilities of downward and lateral mobility, with the relations 
being significant at the 5% level or higher. These results suggest that human capital 
characteristics are important for minimizing job instability and downward mobility risks. 
Regarding the effects of social networks, the estimates show that having a father or a 
spouse with high socio-economic status or a party membership is particularly important 
for upward mobility; the marginal effects of these variables are statistically highly   20 
significant and numerically large. For instance, a 10-point increase in the SEI of father or 
spouse would increase the probability of upward mobility by 3 percent, and a party 
member’s probability of upward mobility is 19.3 percent higher than a non-party 
member’s. Spouses’ SEI and party membership also significantly reduce the probability 
of downward mobility. Moreover, consistent with the conjecture that the restructuring 
forced workers to move to occupations that had less skill requirements and offered lower 
pay, the estimates show that those who acquired the current job after 1996 are 24.9 
percent more likely to undergo downward mobility. The estimates for ownership 
variables show that, compared to those employed in the public sector, workers who had 
quitted or been displaced and subsequently found job in the urban collectives, private or 
informal sectors are more likely to experience downward mobility (by 10.6, 14.2 and 
14.7 percent, respectively). In addition, we note that the probability of downward 
mobility is the highest for the Northeastern region, the region which is deemed China’s 
industrial rust belt.   
Based on the estimates of party member and ownership types we find that the 
gender difference in party membership at sample means attributes to a gender gap of 0.4 
percent in downward mobility and a gap of 1.5 percent in upward mobility, and that the 
gender difference in the share of urban collectives adds 0.53 percent to the gap in 
downward mobility and 0.3 percent to the gap in upward mobility. It is evident that 
women’s under-representation in Communist party and overrepresentation in the urban 
collective sector are a source of the gender gaps in occupational mobility. Nevertheless, 
the gender differences in observed characteristics apparently explain only a small part of 
the gender gaps in occupational mobility, given that controlling for the individual and   21 
market characteristics changes the gender gap in each type of occupational mobility only 
marginally, and all the gender gaps remain significant at the 1% level.   
Table 4 presents the estimates of occupational mobility directions for job movers. 
As in Table 3, Part I of Table 4 reports the overall gender gaps obtained by controlling 
only for regional variations. The estimates reveal a gender gap of 3.7 percent in the 
probability of downward mobility and a gap of -3.5 percent in the probability of upward 
mobility, with both estimates being significant at the 5% level or higher. Part II of the 
table reports the estimates of gender indicator and its interactive term with the dummy 
variable for acquiring current job after 1996 while controlling for individual and market 
characteristics in X and Z. The estimates show that holding constant individual and 
market characteristics, the presence of gender disparity in downward mobility is 
primarily a post-restructuring phenomenon, whereas the gender gap in upward mobility 
was existent prior to the restructuring and the restructuring does not make any difference 
in this regard.   
We next add the reasons of occupational changes to the regression and present all 
the estimates of equation (2) in Part III of Table 4. We find that controlling for reasons of 
change does not change the findings for downward mobility: the stand alone gender 
dummy remains statistically insignificant while the interactive gender dummy variable is 
still significant at the 1% level. The estimates show that other things being equal, women 
who acquired the current job after 1996 are 9.1 percent more likely than their male 
counterparts to undergo downward mobility but 7.7 percent less likely to move to 
occupations with the same socio-economic status. These findings are in line with the 
view that the public-sector restructuring increases the likelihood of downward   22 
occupational change more for women than men. Regarding upward mobility, however, 
both gender variables now become statistically insignificant, indicating that the gender 
gap in upward mobility is primarily a result of the differences in men’s and women’s 
specific causes of occupational changes. Indeed, we note that relative to movers for 
unspecified reasons, the probability of upward mobility is 13.2 percent higher for 
career-oriented moves and 18.4 percent higher for reassignments but 13.5 percent lower 
for involuntary separation and all the aforementioned estimates are significant at the 1% 
level. We also find that involuntary separation significantly reduces the probability of 
downward mobility, by 27 percent. Interestingly, family-oriented changes have no 
significant impact on the directions of occupational mobility-a result similar to the 
finding that family-oriented changes have no effect on wage growth by Cao and Hu 
(2007). Based on the estimates of statistical significance, the gender difference in 
career-oriented moves at sample means implies a gender gap of -0.6 percent in upward 
mobility while the gender differences in two types of employer-initiated moves yield a 
gap of 2.8 percent in downward mobility and a gap of -2.6 percent in upward mobility. 
Apparently, the difference in men’s and women’s career preference plays a less important 
role for explaining the gender gaps in mobility directions than the differences in the ways 
women and men treated by the employers.     
Turning to other explanatory variables, we note that most of the estimates are 
similar to those obtained for job stayers and movers combined and presented in Table 3, 
confirming the robustness of the results. As expected, education reduces the likelihood of 
downward mobility and increases the likelihood of upward mobility. The estimates also 
confirm that having a father or a spouse with high socio-economic status and being a   23 
party member are imperative for minimizing the risk of downward mobility and 
maximizing the prospect of upward mobility. Moreover, other things being equal, 
individuals who changed job after 1996 have a higher probability of downward mobility. 
Relative to public-sector workers, workers in the collective and private sectors are more 
likely to experience downward mobility. 
The estimates presented in Table 5 caste light on the differences in gender patterns 
of mobility directions between administrative job match and non-administrative match. 
For the case of administrative match (see the first three columns), the stand-alone gender 
dummy is insignificant for downward mobility but significant for lateral and upward 
mobility while the interactive gender dummy is insignificant for all three mobility types. 
The estimates indicate that among the movers by company reassignments, women are 6.9 
percent more likely than men to change occupation horizontally, but are 10.6 percent less 
likely to move to occupations with higher socio-economic status. It is evident that women 
confront the glass ceiling in promotion and/or are crowded into the dead-end occupations. 
In contrast, among non-administratively matched movers, significant gender differences 
are found only for downward and lateral mobility in the post-restructuring period (9.8 and 
-9.5 percent, respectively). This result suggests that in the post-restructuring labor market, 
women job seekers face gender discrimination and therefore have no choice but accepting 
job offers with lower socio-economic status. Thus, women are disadvantaged in 
occupational mobility, regardless of whether occupational changes are managed 
administratively or through market mechanisms. Turning to the differences in other 
covariates, we find that education has a stronger positive effect on upward mobility for 
administrative match than non-administrative match. But the most striking difference is   24 
that the occupational status of father and spouse and party membership are way more 
important for reducing downward risk and increasing upward mobility in the case of 
administrative match than the case of non-administrative match. This finding is consistent 
with the view that nepotisms are more prevalent in an administrative regime than a 
market regime.   
5. Conclusions   
China’s economic transition over the past three decades has greatly increased 
occupational mobility, creating new opportunities for career advancement and, at the 
same time, destructing existing jobs and inducing downward occupational changes. In 
this paper, we examine the gender patterns of occupational mobility in urban China using 
data derived from a recent, nationally representative survey. We find that that married 
women are more likely than their male counterparts to experience job instability and 
downward mobility, but are less likely to undergo upward occupational changes. We also 
find that women are more likely than men to choose occupations with lower 
socio-economic status as a coping strategy following the public-sector restructuring. Our 
analysis suggests that women are disadvantaged in the occupational mobility process by a 
variety of social and institutional factors. Chief among these constraints are societal 
gendered role expectations, unequal access to social resources associated with women’s 
political under-representation, unequal entitlements to social protection and assistance 
resulted from pre-reform sex segregation, and gender discrimination in the process of 
promotion and recruitment. As a result of these social and institutional constraints, 
women’s status relative to men’s in the labor market has worsened during the economic 
transition.       25 
In addition to the findings on gender disparities, our analysis also generated several 
important results regarding the operation of China’s urban labor market. We find human 
capital to be important in the occupational mobility process: occupational mobility falls 
with labor market experience while education reduces the risk of downward mobility and 
improves the chance of career advancement. Our results also confirm that family 
connections and political affiliations with the ruling Communist party are important for 
securing and promoting job and career opportunities, especially in the traditional 
administrative labor regime. Moreover, workers respond to the shocks of restructuring by 
choosing occupations with lower human capital requirements and lower pay; the 
incidence of downward occupational changes is more pronounced in non-state sectors 
than the state sector. These results shed new light on the sources and mechanisms of 
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Table 1： ： ： ：Frequency distribution over occupational mobility types, by direction and 
by reason (%)       








Directions of mobility 
Job stayer    30.2  32.2  28.3  -4.0 
Downward   
Mobility  28.1  25.2  30.8  5.6 
Horizontal 
Mobility    18.8  17.1  20.4  3.4 
Upward 
Mobility    22.9  25.5  20.5  -4.9 
Total    100.0  100.0  100.0  ---- 
Observations    6,354  3,058  3,296  ---- 
Reasons of mobility   
Career 
development  22.2  24.4  20.2  -4.2 
Family reasons  15.9  11.0  20.5  9.5 
Company 
reassignment  39.6  45.1  34.4  -10.7 
Involuntary 
separation      17.2  14.8  19.4  4.6 
Others    5.1  4.7  5.4  0.7 
Total    100.0  100.0  100.0  ---- 
Observations    3,099  1,499  1,600  ---- 
 
Source: All tables are based on the Second Survey on Social Status of Chinese Women 
undertaken jointly by All China Women Federation and National Statistical Bureau of 
China in December 2000.       
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Table 2: Mean values of explanatory variables   
  Full sample  Men  Women 
Age    37.28  37.67  36.92 
Years of schooling  9.69  9.96  9.45 
Experience prior to 
Current job    13.15  13.15  13.15 
SEI of first job    48.24  48.70  47.80 
Father’s SEI    46.46  46.06  46.83 
Spouse’s SEI  49.13  48.09  50.10 
Party member     
prior to current job    0.11  0.15  0.07 
Number of children  1.19  1.19  1.19 
Current job acquired 
after 1996  0.30  0.26  0.33 
SOEs & Public 
organizations  0.54  0.57  0.51 
Urban collectives  0.17  0.15  0.20 
Private & foreign 
companies  0.06  0.06  0.06 
Other ownership type  0.23  0.22  0.23 
% employment in 





  Northern Coastal  0.16  0.16  0.16 
  Southern Coastal  0.12  0.12  0.12 
  Eastern Coastal  0.13  0.13  0.13 
  North East  0.13  0.13  0.14 
  Mid-Yangze Range  0.16  0.17  0.15 
  Mid-Huanghe Range    0.13  0.13  0.13 
  South West  0.12  0.12  0.13 
  North West    0.04  0.04  0.04 
Observations    6,354  3,058  3,296 
Notes:    Northern  Coastal  includes  Shandong,  Hebei,  Beijing  and  Tianjin;  Southern 
Coastal  includes  Guangdong,  Fujian  and  Hainan;  Eastern  Coastal  includes  Shanghai, 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang; North East includes Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin; Mid-Yangtze 
Range includes Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Anhui; Mid-Hunaghe Range includes Shaanxi, 
Henan,  Shanxi  and  Inner  Mongolia;  South  West  includes  Guangxi,  Yunnan,  Sichuan, 
Chongqing and Guizhou; North West includes Gansu, Tibet and Xinjiang.     
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Table 3 Multinomial logit estimates of marginal effects for occupational mobility directions of 
the full sample           
  Job stayer    Downward  Lateral    Upward 




      (0.011)*** 
0.055 
    (0.010)*** 
0.034 
    (0.011)*** 
-0.050 
      (0.012)*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.010       
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  Mid-Huanghe Range    -0.033  0.025  0.017  -0.009   34 
(0.028)  (0.045)  (0.036)  (0.045) 








Predict probability  0.172  0.334  0.240  0.254 
Pseudo R
2  0.224       
Observations    6,354       
Notes:    Part I also control for regional effects. The reference group for Part II includes 
men who did not have party membership prior to current job, acquired the current job 
after  1996  and  worked  in  the  state  sector  in  the  north  western  region.  Figures  in 
parentheses are standard errors robust to intra-province correlation. ***, **, and * stand 
for significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.             
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Table 4 Multinomial logit estimates of marginal effects for occupational mobility 
directions of job movers     
  Downward  Lateral    Upward   
Part I   
Gender 
(Women=1) 
0.037   
(0.015)*** 
-0.003 
    (0.015) 
-0.035 
    (0.017)** 
Pseudo R
2            0.011     
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(0.022)***   36 












Regions    yes  yes  yes 
Predicted probability    0.431  0.248  0.321 
Pseudo R
2  0.151     
Observations    3,097     
  Notes:    Part I controls gender and regional effects only, and Part II includes all the explanatory 
variables except those for mobility reasoning. The reference group for Part III consists of men who 
changed  jobs  for  unknown  reason,  did  not  have  party  membership  prior  to  current  job,  acquired 
current  job  after  1996,  and  worked  in  the  public  sector  in  the  north  western  region.  Figures  in 
parentheses  are  standard  errors  robust  to  intra-province  correlation.  ***,  **,  and  *  stand  for 
significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.             
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Table 5. Multinomial logit estimates of marginal effects for occupational mobility 
directions of job movers, by type of job match     
  Administratively matched  Non-administratively matched   
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Regions    yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes   38 
Predicted 
probability   
0.286  0.298  0.415  0.535  0.208  0.256 
Pseudo R
2  0.158      0.142     
Observations    1,227      1,872     
Notes: The administratively matched sample includes those who changed occupations through 
company reassignment, and the non-administratively matched sample consists of those who 
changed occupations for personal development, family and other reasons or as a result of 
involuntary separation.    The reference group is men who did not have party membership prior to 
current job, acquired current job after 1996, and work in the public section in the north western 
region for the first sample and also includes those who changed jobs for other reasons for the 
second one.    Figures in parentheses are standard errors robust to intra-province correlations. ***, 
**, and * stand for significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.             
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Faculties in Universities  14.55  1087  68.15 
Chiefs of Different-level Communist Party  12.62  1578  67.63 
Chiefs of the Enterprises  11.16  2706  65.82 
Designers of airplanes and Ships  12.67  1757  65.5 
Chiefs of Different-level Governments  12.33  1928  65.33 
Engineers  12.93  1465  64.71 
Chiefs of Governmental Affiliated Organizations  11.99  1552  61.93 
Journalists and Writers  12.62  1006  60.91 
Other teachers  11.03  1850  60.33 
Doctors  12.15  947  58.92 
Lawyers and Other Law Professionals  11.83  1130  58.9 
Teachers in Primary Schools  12.33  762  58.47 
Science researchers  11.6  1193  58.45 
Environment Supervision Technician    12.0  700  56.94 
Other Technician    11.21  1067  56.34 
Healthcare assistants  10.78  688  56.27 
Policemen  11.47  862  56.03 
Athletes    11.0  1125  55.95 
Professional in Financial Trade  11.1  1016  55.67 
Staffs at Post offices    10.48  1056  53.74 
Clerks  10.92  712  53.25 
Chiefs of other parties    10.77  739  52.86 
Professionals of trade    10.62  778  52.57 
Staffs at Agencies  10.0  1090  52.25 
Other Healthcare Professionals  10.83  541  51.92 
Professionals of Agricultural Industry    10.6  626  51.61 
Projectionists  10.0  678  49.82 
Chiefs of NGOs  9.2  481  49.76 
Assemblers of Machinery and Electronics  10.06  584  49.48 
Staffs of Metrology and Testing Technology  9.85  664  49.22 
Forestry Workers  9.93  608  49.16 
Healthcare Assistants  9.88  609  48.98 
Workers of Electronic Components  9.79  654  48.93 
Firemen  9.85  587  48.76 
Workers in Tobacco factories  8.91  1133  48.69 
Workers in Chemistry Industry  9.87  535  48.52 
Workers in Pharmaceutical enterprises  8.5  1345  48.5 
Artists  9.87  512  48.38 
Army  9.33  751  47.92 
Nursery School Teachers  9.50  631  47.79 
Staffs of Electricity Installation    and Maintenance  9.32  734  47.78   40 
Workers of Teaching facilities    9.38  546  46.86 
Workers of Construction Materials  9.10  692  46.77 
Staffs of Transportation Industry  8.89  790  46.59 
Repairmen of Machinery Equipment    9.15  612  46.45 
Agricultural Machinery Operators  9.29  522  46.41 
Staffs of realty management  9.12  600  46.29 
Staffs of Storage Industry  9.24  513  46.19 
Workers of Metal Smelt  9.13  559  46.09 
Servants of Transportation Industry  8.83  726  46.02 
Other Staffs in Trade and Service Industry  8.90  683  46.02 
Other Staffs in Production and Transportation  8.86  665  45.77 
Workers of Machinery Processing Industry  9.05  512  45.53 
Hunters  9.38  298  45.40 
Salesman  8.63  694  45.13 
Staffs of Community Services Industry  8.68  624  44.87 
Staffs of Mineral Exploration  8.87  499  44.83 
Servants at Hotels, Travel agents, Gym  8.8  530  44.74 
Other Staffs in Trade and Service Industry  8.75  538  44.63 
Craftworks Producers  9.00  366  44.49 
Workers in Textile, Printing and Dyeing  8.63  442  43.64 
Other staffs of living services  8.31  613  43.55 
Builders  8.17  678  43.43 
Cooks  8.21  655  43.43 
Workers in Printing Industry  8.4  486  43.1 
Other Agricultural Workers  8.70  287  42.98 
Workers of Glass and Porcelain Processing  8.30  492  42.77 
Workers in Food Industry  8.13  482  42.14 
Poultry Producers  7.72  722  42.13 
Paper Making Workers  8.16  420  41.86 
Wood Processing Workers  7.81  602  41.73 
Waiters and Waitress  7.86  460  41.04 
Workers of Rubbers and Plastic  7.89  314  40.31 
Other Kind of Servants in Restaurant  7.59  485  40.26 
Tailors  7.58  396  39.68 
Packagers  7.54  407  39.64 
Unskilled Workers  7.12  387  38.04 
Fishery Workers  7.00  437  37.91 
Farmers  6.78  293  36.28 
  Notes: the SEI scores are derived for each 3-digit occupation using the following formula provided 





2 x are the mean value of years of 
schooling and 1999 monthly income of each occupation, respectively.   
 